Disequilibrium, Self-Selection and Switching Models by Maddala, G. S.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
DISEQUILIBRIUM, SELF-SELECTION AND 
SWITCHING MODELS 
G.S. Maddala 
California Institute of Technology 
and University of Florida 
0o1.C,'t\lUTf OF \� ,.� �,.. � � 1, � i"'.'. ..... 0 
:s Q 
.:.. � 
� � ,,,... cc: 
"P"ll ,� 
�SHALL tAfi>.�\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 303 
February 1980 
ABSTRACT 
The present paper outlines the similarities in the structure 
of self-selectivity models and disequilibrium models. Both these 
models fall under the category of switching models--with sample 
separation known and sample separation unknown. Curiously enough 
the econometric models with self-selectivity are all switching models 
with sample separation known , whereas the econometric models with 
disequilibrium are mostly formulated as switching models with unknown 
sample separation. The paper argues that the reasons for this are 
that not much attention is devoted to the reasons for the existence 
of disequilibrium and the models are all formulated as "rationing" 
models .  I t  is suggested that many empirical applications of 
disequilibrium fall in the category of "trading" models and here the 
sample separation is known and the reasons for the existence of 
disequilibrium are also clear . 
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DISEQUILIBRIUM, SELF-SELECTION AND SWITCHING MODELS
G . S .  Maddala 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The title of this chapter stems from the fact that there 
is an underlying similarity between econometric models involving 
disequilibrium and econometric models involving self-selection , the 
similarity being that both of them can be considered switching 
structural systems . We will first consider a switching regression 
model and show how the simplest models involving disequilibrium 
and self-selection fit in this framework. We will then discuss
switching simultaneous equation models . 
Suppose the observations on a dependent variable y can be 
classif ied into t wo regimes and are generated by different probability
laws in the two regimes . Define 
and 
Y1 = XSl+ ul 
y2 = XS2+ u2 
Y = Yl iff Za-u >O
Y = y2 iff za-u �o
( 1 . 1) 
(1 . 2)
(1 . 3)
(1 .4)
X and Z are (possibly overlapping) sets of  explanatory variables . 
* 
Financ ial support from the Nat ional Science Foundation is gratefully 
acknowledged . A final vers ion of this paper will appear as a chapter
in: Z. Griliches and M. D. Intrilligator (Eds. ) .  Handbook of Econo­
metrics.
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al ' a2 and a are sets of parameters to be estimated . ul , u2 and u are 
residuals that are only contemporaneously correlated . We will assume 
that ( u1 , u2 , u ) are j o intly normally distributed with mean vector O ,
and covariance matrix 
l = / 2 crl2 01u crl 
2 012 cr2 02U 
01u 02u 1 
We have set var (u) =l because , by the nature of the conditions (1 . 3) 
and (1 . 4) a is estimable only up to a scale factor . 
The model given by equations (1 . 1) to (1 .4)  is called a 
switching regression model . If cr1u = cr2u = 0 then we have a model
with exogenous switching . If cr1u or cr2u is non-zero , we have a model 
with endogenous switching . This distinction between switching
regression models with exogenous and endogenous switching has been
discussed at length in Maddala and Nelson (1975) . 
We will also d istinguish between t wo types of switching
regression models . 
Model A: Sample separation known . 
Model B: Sample separat ion unknown.
In the former class we kno w whether each observed y is generated by
(1 . 1) or (1. 2) . In the latter class we do not have this information.
Further, in the models with known sample separation we can consider
t wo categories of models :
Model A-1 : y observed in both regimes.
Model A-2 : y observed in only one of the t wo regimes . 
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We will discuss the estimat ion of these types of models in the next 
section. But f irst , we will give some examples for the three 
different types of models . 
Example 1 : Disequilibrium Market Model : 
'Fair and Jaffe (1972 ) consider a model of the hous ing
market . There is a demand funct ion and a supply function but demand 
is not always equal to supply . (As to why this happens is an important 
question which we will discuss in a later section . )  The specification 
of the model is : 
Demand function : D= XS1 + u1 
Supply function : S =  XS2 + u2 
The quantity transacted , Q ,  is given by 
Q= Min (D , S) 
Thus Q=XS1 + u1 if D < S 
Q=XS2 + u2 if D > S 
The condition D < S can be written as : 
X ( 62-61 ) - ( ul-u2 ) > 0 
0 0 
2 2 2 where cr = var (u1-u2) .= o1 + o2 - 2o12 
Thus the model is the same as the switching regress ion model in 
s -s u -u equations (1 . 1) to (1 . 4) with Z = X, a =�and u = �1- 2 
0 0 
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If sample separation is someho w known , i. e. we know which observat ions 
correspond to excess demand and which correspond to excess supply,
then we have Model A-1 .  If sample separation is not known , we have 
Model B .
Example 2 : Model with self-selection.
Consider the labor supply model considered by Gronau (1974)
and Lewis (1974) . The wages offered W0 to an individual ,  and the 
reservation wages Wr (the wages at which the individual is willing 
to work) are given by the following equations : 
w 0 xsl + ul wr = xs2 + u2 
The individual works and the observed wage W = W0 if W0�Wr. If W0 < Wr , 
the individual does not work and the observed wages are W = Q. 
This is an example of Model A-2 . The dependent variable is observed 
in only one of the two regimes. The observed distribut ion of wages is 
a truncated distribution - it is the distribution of wage offers
truncated by the "Self-selection" of individuals - each individual 
choosing to be ' in the sample' of working individuals or not , by
comparing his (or her) wage offer with his (or her) reservation wage . 
Example 3: Demand for Durable Goods : 
This example is similar to the labor-force participation 
model in Example 2 .  Let y1 denote the expenditures the family can 
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afford to make, and y2 denote the value of the minimum acceptable
car to the family (the threshhold value) . 
The actual expenditures y will be defined as y=y1 iff y1 � y2 
= 0 otherwise.
Example 4: Needs vs. Reluctance Hypothesis . 
Banks are reluctant to frequent the discount windo w  too
often for fear of adverse sanctions from the Federal Reserve. One 
can define : 
Y1 
Y2 
Desired borrowings 
Threshhold level below which banks will not use the 
d iscount window.
The structure of this model is somewhat different from that given in 
examples 2 and 3,  because we observe y1 all the time . We do not
observe y2 but we know for each observation whether y1 � y2 (the bank 
borrows in the Federal funds market) or y1 > y2 (the bank borrows 
from the discount window) . 
Some other examples of the type of switching regression 
model considered here are the unions and wages model by Lee (1978 ) ,
the housing demand model by Lee and Trost (1978) , and the education
and self-selection model of Willis and Rosen (1979) . 
2 . ESTIMATION OF THE SWITCHING REGRESSION MODEL : S AMPLE SEPARATION 
KNOWN . 
Returning to the model given by equations (1 . 1) to (1 . 4) , we 
note that the likelihood function is given by (dropping the t 
subscripts on u , X, Z ,y and I) 
2 2 
o o L ( 81 , 82 , a , ol • 02 ' 12 ' lu' 02u) 
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T [ 
J
za ] I 
=
t�l g1 (y-X81) f1CuJy-X81) du 
-00 
[ g2 (y-X82) f ;2 (uJy-X82) du ] l-I (2-1) 
Za 
where I 1 iff Za - u > 0 
0 otherwise.
and the bivariate normal density of (u1 ,u) has been factored into the 
marginal density g1Cu1) and the conditional density f1 (uJu1) ,  with a 
similar factorization of the b ivariate normal density of (u2 ,u) . Note
that 012 does not occur at all in the likelihood function and thus is
not estimable in this model . Only crh.i and o2u are estimable . In the 
special case u = 
ul-u2 where cr2 = Var (u1-u2) as in the examples in 
a 
the previous section , it can be easily verified that from the 
. . f 2 2 d . consistent estimates o cr1 , cr2 , o1u an o2u we can get a con
sistent
estimate of 012 . 
The maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained by an 
iterative solution of the likelihood equations using the Newton-Raphson
method or the Berndt et-al . (1974) method .  The latter involves
obtaining only the f irst derivatives of the likelihood function and 
has better convergence properties . In Lee and Trost (1978) it is 
shown that the log-likelihood function for this model is uniformly 
bounded from above. The maximum likelihood estimates of this model
can be shown to be consistent and asymptotically efficient following 
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the lines of proof that Amemiya (1973) gave for the Tobit model . To
start the iterative solution of the likelihood equations , one can use
preliminary consistent estimates of the parameters which can be
obtained by using a two-stage estimation method which is described
in Lee and Trost (1978) 1 , and will not be reproduced here.
There are some variations of this switching regression 
model that are of considerable interest. The first is the case of
the labor supply model where y is observed in only one of the two
regimes (Model A-2) . The model is given by the follo wing relationships : 
y Y1 if Y1::: Y2 
0 otherwise
For the group I 
For the group I 
1 ,  we kno w y1 = y and Y2 � Y 
O, all we know is y1 < Y2 
Hence the likelihood function for this model can be written as : 
where
2 2 
1(81 , 82 , crl , cr2 , crl2) 
T 
II 
t=l 
g2t 
[ f f (glt ' u2t ) du ] It 2t [ ]1-I 1-�t t 
-·CX> 
glt = yt - Xt 81 
g2t = Yt - Xt82 
�t = � [ xt <82 :81 ) J 
cr2 Var (u1-u2) 
2 2 crl + cr2 - 2crl2
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� ( . )  is the distribution function of the standard normal and f is the 
j o int density of (ult' u2t) . Since y is observed only in one of the 
regimes, we need to impose some identifiability restrictions on the 
parameters of the model . These restrictions are : 
or
(a) There should be at least one explanatory variable 
in (1 . 1) not included in (1 . 2) 
(b) cov (u1 ,u2) = 0 .
These conditions were first derived in Nelson (1975 ) and 
since then have been re-derived by others . The most straightforward 
way of deriving these conditions (see Maddala (1978) for this) is to 
note that , in the switching regression model given by equations (1 . 1) 
- (1. 4) .
(i) The probit estimation based on the dichotomous variable 
I gives us a consistent estimate of a. 
( ii) The two-stage estimation based on observation on y in 
regime 1 gives us consistent estimates of 81 , cr1
2 and cr1u. 
( iii) The two-stage estimation based on observations on y in 
regime 2 gives us consistent estimates of 82 , cr2
2 and cr2u . 
In the present case,  where a = 81-82 and u = u2-ul and there ar� no
cr cr 
observations on y in regime 2 ,  this translates to the fact that we 
2 cr -cr 2 -8 have cons istent estimates of only 81 , cr1 , � , and � 2 .  If cr cr 
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there is one explanatory variable in (1.1) not included in (1 . 2),  then 
f\. and � corresponding to this variable , since we have estimates of J cr 
we can get a consistent estimate of cr and hence consistent estimates 
of all the elements of S2. 
. 2 2 cr -cr 2 From the estJ.mates of cr , cr1 and � cr 
we now get an estimate of cr12 and hence also of cr2
2 Thus all 
parameters are estimable . Alternatively , if cr12 = 0 ,  since we have 
. 2 cr 2 . estJ.mates of cr1 and - .!.__ we get an estimate of cr. This enables us cr 2 to get estimates of s2 and also cr2 Thus again all parameters are 
estimable . 
Note that the identification conditions are the same in the 
case of example 4 in the previous section where y1 is observed for all
observations. The important fact is that there are no observations on 
Y2·
The second variation of the switching regression model that 
has found wide application is where the criterion function determining 
the switching also involves y1 and y2 i . e .  equations (1 . 3 )  and (1 . 4) 
are replaced by
Where 
* y = Y1 iff I > o 
* y = Y2 iff I ::: o 
* I = Y1 Y1 + Y2 y2 + Za-u. (2 .  3)
Examples of this model are the unions and wages model by Lee (1978 )
and the education and self-selection model by Willis and Rosen (1979).
In both cases, the choice function (2. 3) determining the switching 
involves the income differential (y1-y2).  Thus y2= -y1• Interest
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centers on the sign and significance of the coefficient of (y1 - y2).
The estimation of this model proceeds as before . We first
write the criterion function in its reduced form and estimate the
parameters by the probit method.  Note that , for normalization
purposes , instead of imposing the condition Var (u) = 1 , it is more
convenient to impose the condition that the variance of the residual
* u in the reduced form for (2.3) is unity.
* i.e. Var (u ) Var (y1 u1 + y2 u2 - u) = 1 (2. 4 )
This means that Var (u) = cr 2 i s  a parameter t o  b e  estimated . But ,  in u 
the switching regression model, the parameters that are estimable are : 
2 2 S1 , s2 , cr1 , cr2 , crlu* ' and cr2u* 
* 
02u 
* cov(u2 ,u ).
* where cr1u 
* cov(u1 ,u ) and 
The estimates of crlu* and cr2u* together with the normalization equation 
(2.4) give us only 3 equations from which we still have to estimate
2 four parameters cr12 , crlu ' cr2u and cru . Thus , in this model we have to
impose the condition that one of the covariances cr12 , crlu ' cr2u is zero . 
The most natural assumption is cr12 = 0 .
As for the estimation of the parameters in the choice
function (2. 3),  again we have to impose some conditions on the 
explanatory variables in y1 and y2 . After obtaining estimates of the 
parameters s1 and s2 , we get the estimated values y1 and y2 of y1 and 
y2 respectively and estimate the parameters in ( 2.3) by the probit
method using these estimated values for y1 and y2 . The condition for
the estimability of the parameters in (2. 3) is clearly that there be
no perfect multicollinearity between y1 , y2 and z.
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This procedure, called the "two-stage probit method" gives 
consistent estimates of the parameters of the choice function. Note
that since (y1-y1) and (y2-y2) are heteroscedastic , the residuals 
in this two-stage probit method are heteroscedastic .  But this 
heteroscedasticity exists only in small samples and the residuals are 
homoscedastic asymptotically , thus preserving the consistency
properties of the two-stage probit estimates . For a proof of this 
proposition and the derivation of the asymptotic covariance matrix 
of the two-stage probit estimates , see Lee (19 79).
3. ESTIMATION OF THE SWITCHING REGRESSION MODEL : SAMPLE SEPARATION 
UNKNOWN 
In this case we do not know whether each observation belongs
to regime 1 or regime 2 .  The labor supply model clearly does not fall
in this category because the sample separation is known automatically . 
In the disequilibrium market model , where the assumption of unknown 
sample separation has been often made , what this implies is that given 
j ust the data on quantity transacted and the explanatory variables , 
we have to estimate the parameters of both the demand and supply 
functions. Once we estimate these parameters , we can estimate the 
probability that each observation belongs to the demand and the supply 
functiox:.
Consider the s implest disequilibrium model with sample 
separation unknown: 
Dt 
st 
Qt 
XltSl + ult (Demand function)
X2t S2 + u2t ( Supply function)
Min (Dt , St ) 
The probability that observation t belongs to the demand function 
is:
\ Prob (Dt < St ) 
Prob (ult - u2t < X2tS2 - JS.tSl) 
Let f (u1 ,u2) be the joint density of (u1, u2) and g (D , S) the joint 
density of D and S derived from it . 
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( 3 . 1) 
If observation t is on the demand function, we know that Dt 
St > Qt. Hence,
Qt and 
h ( Q  \Q = D ) t t t f� g(Qt , St )dS /A J i t t t ( 3. 2) 
The denomination At in (3 . 2) is the normalizing constant . It is equal 
to the numerator integrated over Qt over its entire range. Similarly , 
if observation t is on the supply function , we know that St = Qt and 
Dt > Qt . Hence,
h ( Qt I Qt = St) J�tg (Dt , Qt)dDt/(l - At) 
Hence, the unconditional density of Qt is: 
h ( Qt) = At h ( Qt\Qt = Dt) + (l - At)h ( Qt\Qt 
= �� g ( Qt , St)dSt + J: g (Dt , Qt )dDt t t ' 
( 3 .  3)
St) 
( 3 . 4) 
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The likelihood function is : 
L = �h (Qt) (3 . 5 )  
As will be shown later, the likelihood function for this model i s  un-
bounded for certain parameter values . 
Once the parameters in the model have been estimated, we 
can estimate the probability that each ob servation is on the demand 
function or the supply funct ion. Maddala and Nelson (1974 )  suggest 
estimat ing the expressions At in ( 3 . 1) . These were the probabilities
calculated in Sealy ( 1979)  and Portes and Winter (1980 ) . Kiefer (1980) 
has pointed out that (3 . 1) does not use all the sample information viz. 
The data on Qt . He , therefore , sugges ts calculating:
P (Dt < StiQt) 
Kiefer derives this probability in a model where u1 and u2 are un-
correlated . We will derive it for a general model . 
(3 . 6) as : 
N · h P (AiB) = P ( AB)  = P (BiA) • P (A) , we can writeoting t at P (B)  P (B) 
( 3 . 6) 
Prob (Dt < StiQt) 
Prob (Qt l nt < St) • Prob ( Dt < St) 
Prob (Qt) (3_7) 
But the numerator of (3 . 7) , from ( 3 . 2 ) ,  is just 
Hence, 
J: g(Qt' St) dSt . 
t 
Prob ( Dt < stiQt) = �: g (Qt , St)dSt/h (Qt) t 
where h (Qt) is defined in ( 3 . 4 ) . 
( 3. 8) 
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If u 1 and u2 are independent so that g ( Dt , St) can be written as 
g1( Dt) • g2 ( St) and G1 and G2 are the distribution funct ions corre­
sponding to the density functions g1 and g2 respectively, then ( 3 . 8) 
simplifies to : 
gl (Qt) [l - G2 (Qt ) ] 
Prob ( Dt < StiQt ) gl (Qt) [l - G2 (Qt) ] + g2 ( Qt) [l - Gl (Qt) ] ( 3 . 9 )  
The likelihood function ( 3 . 5) simplifies in this case to: 
L = �{gl (Qt ) [l - G2 (Qt ) ]  + g2 ( Qt) [l - Gl ( Qt ) ]} ( 3 . 10 ) 
Noting the relat ionship between ( 3 . 9 )  the likelihood function and 
(3 . 10) or between ( 3 . 8 )  and the corresponding likelihood function 
( 3 . 5 ) ,  it is clear that the calculation of the conditional probabili-
ties ( 3 . 5 )  are computationally feasible. Even in a complicated model , 
these relationships hold good . Note that in a more complicated model 
(say with stochastic price adjustment equations) to calculate At as in 
(3 . 1) we have to derive the marginal distributions of Dt and St . To 
compute ( 3. 8) we need to derive the j oint distribution of Dt and St . 
This is the main difference between the expressions (3 . 1) and ( 3 . 8 ) . 
There are two maj or problems with the models with unknown 
sample separation, one conceptual and the other statist ical . The 
conceptual problem is that we are asking too much from the data when 
we do not know which ob servations are on the demand function and which 
are on the supply function. The results cannot normally be expected 
to be very good though the frequency with which 'good' results are re-
ported with this method are indeed surprising. For instance, in 
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Sealey (1979) the standard errors for the disequilibrium model (with 
sample separation unknown) are in almost all cases lower than the 
corresponding standard errors for the equilibrium model! Goldfeld and 
and Quandt (1975) analyze the value of sample separation information 
by Monte-Carlo methods and Kiefer (1979) analyzes analytically the 
value of such information by comparing the variances of the parameter 
estimates in a switching regression model from a joint density of (y,D) 
and the marginal density of y (where y is a continuous variable and 
D is a discrete variable). These results show that there is consider-
able loss of information if sample separation is not known. In view 
of this, some of the empirical results being reported from the estima-
tion of disequilibrium models with unknown sample separation are sur-
prisingly good. Very often, if we look more closely into the reasons 
why disequilibrium exists, then we might be able to say something about 
the sample separation itself. This point will be discussed later in 
our discussion of disequilibrium models. 
The statistical problem is that the likelihood functions 
for this class of models are usually unbounded unless some restrictions 
(usually unjustifiable) are imposed on the error variances. As an 
illustration, consider the model in equations (1.1) to 1.4): 
Define Prob (y=y1) 
Prob (y=y2) 
IT 
1-IT 
The conditional density of y given y=y1 is: 
fCy!y1) = f1(y-X81)/IT. 
Similarly, fCY I Yz) = f2(y-X8z/Cl-IT) 
Hence, the unconditional density of y is: 
f(y) = [f1(y-X81) + f2(y-X82)] 
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Where f1 and f2 are the density functions of u1 and u2 respectively. 
Thus, the distribution of y is the mixture of two normal distributions. 
Given n observations yi, we can write the likelihood function as: 
where 
and 
L = (Al + Bl) (A2 + Bz)----(An + Bn)
1 A. = - exp
l. O"l 
1 B. = - exp
l. Oz 
[- t- (Y. - X.81)2] 0"12 l. l. 
[- �O"z2 (Yi - Xi82)2] 
Take cr2#o and consider the behaviour of L as cr1+ o 
If xlsl y1, then A1 + 00 and A2, A3,-----An all + o. 
But B1, B2,----Bn are finite. Hence L + oo. Thus, as cr1+ o the 
A 
(3.11) 
likelihood function tends to infinity if Xi8l = yi for any value of i. 
Similarly, if cr1#o, then as cr2 + o the likelihood function tends to 
A infinity if Xi8z = yi for any value of i. 
The case of the disequilibrium model with unknown sample 
separation is similar. Consider the simplest formulation: 
Dt 81 pt+ ult 
st 82 pt+ U2t 
Qt = Min (Dt,St)
with (u1t,uZt) both contemporaneously and serially uncorrelated. 
If Q is on the demand function, D = Q and S > Q. Similarly, if Q 
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is on the supply function, S = Q and D > Q. Hence likelihood function 
for this model is of the form (3.11) with 
Ai 
B. l. 
fl (Qi) [1-F2 (Qi) J 
f2 (Qi) [l-Fl(Qi) J 
Where f1 and f 2 are the density functions of u1 and u2 respectively 
and F1 and F2 are the corresponding distribution functions. 
Take Bl = Max 
Suppose this maximum is 
Q 
(__!.) pt 
Qk.pk
Suppose a2 ¢ 0 and consider the behaviour of Ai and Bi as a1 + 0.
Since Qk - 81Pk = 0 and Qj - 81Pj < 0 for j ¢ k we will have, 
f1(Qk) + 00 and f1(Qj) + 0 for j ¢ k
F1(Qk) + 1/2 and F1(Qj) + 0 for j ¢ k
f2(Qj) and F2(Qj) are finite for all j. 
Thus, all Bi will be finite. 
� + oo and all the other Ai will be finite. Hence L + 00 as a1+ 0.
In more complicated models, for instance the watermelon 
market model considered by Goldfeld and Quandt (1975) where 
unboundedness of the likelihood function is demonstrated, the proof 
is more complicated, but the structure of the proof is the same as 
in the simple model above. 
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This unboundedness does not occur in models with known 
sample separation, nor does it occur if we assume a22 = ca12 where 
c is known. In this case if one of the Ai + 00, we can show that some 
of the other factors (A. + B.) + O . The consequence of the J J 
unboundedness of the likelihood function is that in practical work, 
the maximization of the likelihood function might pose problems in 
that successive iterations might produce higher and higher values of 
the likelihood without ever converging. This is the reason why 
Goldfeld and Quandt imposed the condition a22 = ca12 with c known. 
One can see this problem occuring if the successive higher values of 
the likelihood correspond to lower and lower values of one of the 
residual variances. In such cases one might want to fix the values 
of these residual variances so as to prevent them from declining and 
then maximize with respect to the other parameters. The maximum we 
locate this way will of course be a local maximum rather than a 
global one. However, .Amemiya and Sen [1977] show that the true 
parameter value in this model is a local maximum likelihood estimate 
even if the global maximum likelihood estimate diverges. Therefore, 
if we can choose the initial estimate in our iterations close enough 
to the true value, the local maximum likelihood estimate will converge 
to the true value.2
Goldfeld and Quandt (1980) examine in detail the simple dis-
equilibrium model with unknown sample separation and with 
Cov Cu1,u2) = �a1a2. They derive the likelihood function (3.5) and 
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simplify it by factoring the joint density g(Dt, St) into the marginal 
density of one variable (Dt or St, whichever is equal to Qt) and the 
conditional density of the other variable. 
Define for compactness of notation 
wlt 
Qt - XltBl 
crl
w = Qt - x2tB22t cr 2 
z 
1 
lt = /1 - �
2
1 
22t = /1 
_
�
2
[W2t - �lt] 
[Wlt - �W2t] 
Then h(Qt) in (3.4) can be written as: 
h(Qt) = � ¢ (Wlt)[l - �(Zlt)] + � ¢ (W2t)[l - �(Z2t)]1 2 
(3. 12) 
(3.13) 
where ¢(•) and �(·) and the density function and distribution function 
of the standard normal. Goldfeld and quandt then show that if a set of 
values for 81, 82, cr1 and cr2 are chosen such that:
w1t + w2t < O for all t (3.
14) 
then the likelihood function (3. 13) can only increase as � + -1. 
Similiarly, if 
w2t > wlt if � ¢(w2t) > � ¢(wlt)2 1 
w2t < wlt otherwise 
20 
(3.15) 
then the likelihood function (3. 13) increases as � + + 1. Goldfeld 
and Quandt claim that conditions (3.14) and (3.15) are often encoun-
tered in the empirical estimation of this model and, in fact, that 
this problem is more frequent than the problem of unboundedness of 
the likelihood function. 
The disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation 
that we have been discussing is a switching regression model with 
endogenous switching. The case of a switching regression model with 
exogenous switching and unknown sample separation has been extensively 
discussed in Quandt and Ramsay (1978) and the discussion that followed 
their paper. 
The model in this case is: 
I 
Regime 1: yi = x1i8l + Eli with probability A 
Regime 2: yi = x2iBZ + Ezi with probability (1 - A)
Eli �IN (O, crl2) E2i �IN(O,cr22) 
21 
As noted earlier, the likelihood function for this model be-
comes unbounded for certain parameter values. However, the following 
results are known for this model: 
(a) Kiefer ( 1978) has shown that a root of the likelihood equa-
(b) 
tions corresponding to a local maximum is consistent, asymp-
totically normal and efficient. 
Hartley (19 7 7) suggests an algorithm for the iterative 
solution of the likelihood equations which, he says, can be 
shown to be equivalent to the EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird 
and Rubin ( 1977)  for this problem. He finds, in the limited 
Monte Carlo experiments he conducted, that convergence to a 
solution of the likelihood equations corresponding to a local 
maximum of the likelihood function always obtains and that 
point estimates are very close to the parameter values (for 
moderate sample sizes of 100 observations). 
The EM method involves substitution of expected values for 
the missing variables (E-part) and then maximizing the likelihood 
function (M-part). To implement it in this case Hartley suggests 
defining an auxiliary variable Zi"' IN(µ,l). 
If Zi < 0 then yi belongs to Regime 1 .
If Zi > 0 yi belongs to Regime 2 . 
Thus A prob (Zi < O) cjl(-µ). 
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The case where Zi are observed corresponds to known sample separation.
Since Zi are "missing", Hartley suggests evaluating E(Z. ly. ) and sub-1 1 
stituting these missing values for zi. The details of this method are 
described for a more general case (where A varies with each observation) 
in Hartley (1977,  19 78) and need not be reproduced here. 
(c) Quandt and Ramsay ( 1978) suggest an MGF (moment generating 
function) estimator for this model. Note that the moment 
generating function of y is: 
E(e6Y) 
I 620 2 A exp [x1s1e + -zl l
2 2 
+ (1 - A) exp [xzS26 + 6 cr2 ] 
-2-
( 3 . 16 ) 
Select a set of 6. (j--= 1, 2 .. . k) and replace in equation J 
(3 . 16) .
and 
y 
ef 1 nE(e ) by - !: n i ,;., 1 
I 
e �j
yi
n I 1 exp (6.x1S1) by - !: exp (6. x1iS1)J n i = l J 
I 1 n exp cej x2S2) by� !: exp (6jxZiS2)
i = 1 
Quandt and Ramsay's MGF method is to estimate the parameters 
(A, S1, s2 , oi , cr� ) by minimizing
j 
where 
k 
E [.!. 
1 n i
Zi(8j) 
n 
E Zi(8.) 
1 J 
exp (8 jy i) 
1 n- E ( 2 n i = 1 G y,xi,8.)] J 
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( 3 . 1 7) 
and G(y,x.,8.) is the value of the expression on the right hand side i J 
of ( 3 . 16)  for 8 = 8. and the ith observation. J 
The normal equations obtained by minimizing ( 3 . 1 7) with re-
spect to y are the same as those obtained by minimizing 
j 
k n 2 E E [Zi(8.) - G(y,xi18.)] l i = l  J J 
The normal equations in both cases are 
3G EE [Zi(8.) - G(y,x.,8.) l ay = 0 i j J i J 
( 3 . 18)
(3.19)
One major problem with the MGF method is the choice of the 8. values. J 
Quandt and Ramsay say that the 8. should be chosen so as to ensure the J 
non-singularity of the equation system ( 3 . 19 ) . They derive the asymp-
totic distribution of the MGF estimates and present some Monte Carlo 
evidence to show that its performance is satisfactory. The discussants 
of the Quandt and Ramsay paper pointed out that the authors had perhaps 
exaggerated the problems with the ML method, that they should compare 
their method with the ML method, and perhaps use the MGF estimates as 
starting values for the iterative solution of the likelihood equations. 
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In summary, there are many problems with the estimation of 
switching models with unknown sample separation and much more work needs 
to be done before one can judge the empirical results in this area. 
The literature on self-selection deals with switching models with known 
sample separation but the literature on diseq�ilibrium models contains 
several examples of switching models with unknown sample separation 
(see Sealey (19 79 ) ,  Rosen and Quandt (19 79 )  and Portes and Winter (1980) ) .
These studies are all based on the hypothesis of the minimum condition 
holding on the aggregate so that the aggregate quantity transacted 
switches between being on the demand curve and the supply curve. The 
validity of this assumption could be as much a problem in the interpreta-
tion of the empirical results as the estimation problems discussed 
above. The problems of aggregation are as important as the problems 
of estimation with unknown sample separation. 
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4 .  SWITCHING SIMULTANEOUS SYSTEMS 
We now consider generalizations of the model (1 . 1) to (1 . 4) 
to a simultaneous equation system. Suppose the set of endogenous 
variables Y are generated by the following two probability laws: 
BlYl + Ii X = Ul (4 . 1) 
B2Y2 + I; X = u2 (4 . 2) 
and 
y = yl iff Za-v > o (4 . 3) 
y = y2 iff Zet-v < o (4 . 4) 
If v is uncorrelated with u1 and u2 , we have switching simultaneous
systems with exogenous switching . Goldfeld and Quandt (1978) 
consider models of this kind . Davidson (1978) and Richard (1978) 
consider switching simultaneous systems where the number of endogenous 
variables could be different in the two regimes . The switching is 
still exogenous . An example of this type of model mentioned by 
Davidson is the estimation of a simultaneous equation model where 
exchange rates are fixed part of the time and floating the rest of 
the time . Thus the exchange rate is endogenous in one regime and 
exogenous in the other regime . 
If the residual v is correlated with u1 and u2 we have 
endogenous switching . The analysis of such models proceeds the same 
way as section 2 and the details , which merely involve algebra , will 
not be pursued here.  (See Lee [1979] for the details) . Problems 
arise, however , when the criterion function in (4 . 3) and (4 . 4) involves 
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some of the endogenous variables in the structural system. In this 
case we have to write the criterion function in its reduced form and 
make sure that the two reduced form expressions amount to the same 
condition . This point can be illustrated by a couple of examples . 
Consider the watermelon market model discussed by Goldfeld 
and Quandt. 
Let q. = crop of watermelons 
p = price of watermelons 
x = desired harvest (x_::.q)
y = actual harvest 
zl' Z2 , z3 are sets of exogenous variables.
The model consists of the following equations: 
q = blZl + b2 + ul (4. 5 )  
x = b3p + b4q + b5z2 + b6 + u2 i f  x < q (4 . 6) 
q otherwise. 
p = b7z3 + b8y + b9 + u3 (4 . 7 ) 
y = Min (x , q) (4 . 8) 
We have rewritten equations ( 4 . 6) in a more illuminating way than in 
the Goldfeld-Quandt paper. The other equations are the same as in 
their paper . Goldfeld and Quandt consider the estimation of the 
model with q unobserved and q observed. Let us consider the latter 
case . We can divide the observations into two regimes : 
x < q 
x > q 
in which case y 
in which case y 
x 
q 
2 7 
The model is essentially a switching simultaneous system which can 
be written as foliows : 
Regime 1 :  x < q 
y = x 
q = blZl + b2 + ul 
x = b3p + b4q + b5z2 + b 6 + u2 
p = b7z3 + b8x+b9 + u3 
Regime 2 : x > q 
y = q 
q = blZl + b 2 + ul 
x = b3p + b4q + b5z2 + b6 + u2 
p = b7z3 + b8q + b9 + u3 
The third structural equation is different in the two regimes . 
Writing the reduced form for x and q in Regime 1 ,  the 
condition x < q implies : 
__ 
l_ (b4u1 + u2 + b3u3) - u1 1 - b3b8 
� 
< 
DlLl T 02 - 1 - b b (b4b1Zl + b5Z2 + b3b7Z3 + b6 + 3 8 
b3b9 + b4b2) 
If we assume (1 - b3b8) > 0 we can multiply throughout by this factor
and get 
(b4 + b3b8 - 1) u1 + u2 + b3u3 
< (1 - b3b8 - b4) (b1z1 + b2) -(b5z2 + b 6) -b3(b7z3 + b 9) 
Similarly , in Regime 2 , we obtain the reduced forms for x and q and 
the condition x > q gives 
(b4 + b3b8 - l)u1 + u2 + b3u3 
(4 . 9) 
> (1 - b3b8 - b4) (b1z1 + b2) - (b5z2 + b 6) - b3(b7z3 + b 9) (4 . 10)
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Conditions (4 . 9) and (4 . 10) are thus mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
On the other hand, if (1 - b3b8) < 0 we would have both the conditions 
x < q in Regime 2 producting the condition (4.10) thus leading to 
contradictions . Thus , the condition for logical cons istency of this 
model is (1 - b3b8) > O .  Since b3 is expected t o  be positive and b8 
is expected to be negative, this condition is automatically satisfied 
in this case . 
Such conditions for logical consistency have been pointed out by 
Amemiya (1974) , Maddala and Lee (1976) and Heckman (1978) . They 
need to be imposed in switching simultaneous systems where the switch 
depends on some of the endogenous variables . Gourieroux et . al .  (1978) 
have derived some general conditions which they call "coherency 
conditions" and illustrate them with a number of examples . These 
conditions are derived from a theoreum by Samelson eLal . (1958) 
which gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a linear space 
to be partitioned in cones.  We will not go into these conditions in 
detail here . In the case of the switching simultaneous system 
considered here , the condition they derive is that the determinants 
of the matrices giving the mapping from (q ,x,p) to (u1 ,u2 ,u3) are of
the same sign. 
In regime 1 (x < q) we have : 
� l: 1 = [-:. _:. -:, 1�1- l :: 1 
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In regime 2 (x >q) we have : 
., (: 1 = (-:. _
:. 
-
:, H: 1 - ( :: 1 
Hence,  !A1 1 = 1 - b3b8 and !A2i = 1. The condition that both have the
same sign gives the condition that 1 
-
b3b8>0 derived earlier . We 
will use the conditions derived by Gourieroux et.al. (1978) again in 
our discussion of multi-market disequilibrium models (section 8) .  
As yet another example. Consider the model: 
yl = Y1Y2 + SiX1 + ul 
Y2 = y2Y1 + s2x2 + u2 if Y1 < c 
= YiYl + S2x2 + u2 if Y1 � c 
The two determinants under consideration are (l-y1y2) and (l-y1yi) · 
The condition for logical consistency of the model is that they are 
of the same sign or (l-y1y2) (l-y1yi) > O. A question arises about 
what to do with these conditions . One can impose them and then 
estimate the model. Alternatively , since the condition is algebraic , 
if it cannot be given an economic interpretation, it is important to 
check the basic structure of the model. As an illustration consider 
the dummy endogenous variable model by Heckman (197 6) .  The model 
is defined as follows : 
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Let Yi = Wages of blacks relative to whites in state i 
Xi = vector of exogenous variables 
Si = Sentiment favoring fair employment legislat ion in state i 
Di = 1 if state i has a fair employment law 
Di 
0 otherwise. 
1 if s. > 0 
l. 
0 otherwise .  
The structural equations are :  
Yi = XliSl + o lDi + ylSi + uli
Si + X2iS2 + o2Di + y2Yi + u2i 
This is a switching simultaneous system which can be written as 
follows : 
Regime 1 :  Si > 0 
Yi = XliSl + 01 + ylSi + uli
Si = X2iS2 + 02 + y2Yi + u2i 
Regime 2 : Si � O 
Yi = XliSl + ylSi + uli 
Si = X2iS2 + y2Yi + u2i 
The reduced form for Si in Regime 1 is : 
Si 
l_ 
l-Y1Y2 X2i
S2 + Y2 XliSl + u 2i + y2uli + 0 2 + Y2°1 
The reduced form for Si in Regime 2 is : 
Si 
l_ 
l-yly2 X2i
S2 + Y2 XliSl + u2i + y2uli
(4 . 11) 
(4 . 12) 
(4 . 13) 
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Since both of these expressions have to be the same we require that 
o2 + y2 o1 = 0 .  This is the condition for the logical consistency of 
the model . The question is whether it can be given a meaningful 
interpretation. 
Consider the interpretation of equations (4.12) and (4 . 13) .  
Equation (4 . 12) can be very easily j ustified since our obj ective is 
to study the effect of the passage of the fair employment laws per se 
after allowing for the sentiment in favor of fair employment laws . 
It is, however ,  the "sentiment" equation - equation (4.13) that is 
hard to justify. How can the passage of the law affect sentiment in 
the same period? If we set o2 = O, the logical consistency condition 
o2 + y2o1 = 0 implies either o1 = 0 or y2 = O. But ,  o1 is precisely 
the coefficient we are interested in. Hence we ought to have y2 = 0 .
But the reason why Heckman included the variable Yi in equation (4 . 13) 
is to capture the fact that in "states with much market discrimination 
the demand for antidiscrimination on the part of blacks is high, and 
through logrolling, this lends to a greater incidence of fair 
employment legislation in these states" (Heckman [1976] p .  236) .  
This is an important argument but what this says is that it is 
equation (4.11) that needs to be changed. Equation (4 . 13) should 
still be defined with o2 y2 = O . But since the passage of the law 
depends on two factors : 
and 
(i) the positive sentiment in favor of blacks 
(ii) the pressure from blacks for passage of such 
laws because of a low value of yi due to the 
presence of market discrimination . 
32 
it is not Si that determines the dummy variable Di (passage of the 
law) . It is some combination of Si and Yt where Yt is the value of 
yi for Di = 0 (the wages of blacks relative to whites that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the law) that determines the passage 
of the law. 
Instead of (4.11) we now have 
Di 1 if Si + 8yt > 0 
0 otherwise. 
where Yt = XliSl + y1Si + uli 
(4 .11) 
and 8 measures the weight attached to the pressure from blacks for 
legislation of fair employment laws. 
Define St = Si + 8yt 
St is pressure for legislation . 
We have 
St = (1  + y18) S i + x1iCS18) + 8uli (4 . 14) 
Note that in this formulation S. is not observed even as a dichotomous 1 
variable. We have here a model with an unobserved latent variable Si' 
which occurs as an explanatory variable in two equations : 
and 
Yi as given by ( 4.12) 
sr as given by (4 . 14) 
This is similar to the MIMIC model discussed by Joreskog and Goldberger 
(1975) except that of the two indicators, one is continuous and the 
other dichotomous . Estimation of this model is discussed in Maddala 
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(1980) .  The important point to note is that a careful examination of 
the "logical consistency" condition can reveal problems with the original 
formulation of the model and lead to alternative formulations of the 
samp problem. 
The simultaneous equations models with truncated dependent 
variables considered by Amemiya (19 74) are also switching simultaneous 
equations models which require conditions for logical consistency. Again, 
one needs to examine whether these conditions need to be imposed exo-
genously or whether a more logical formulation of the problem leads to a 
model where these conditions are automatically satisfied . For instance, 
Waldman (19 79 )  gives an example of tome allocation of young men to school 
and work where the model is formulated in terms of underlying behavioural 
relations and the conditions derived by Amemiya follow naturally from 
economic theory . On the other hand,. these conditions have to be imposed 
exogenously (and are difficult to give an economic interpretation) if the 
model is formulated in a mechanical fashion where time allocated to work 
was modelled as a linear function of school time and exogenous variables 
and time allocated to school was modelled as a linear function of work 
time and exogenous variables . 
The point of this lengthy discussion is that in switching vari-
ables, we often have to impose some conditions for the logical consistency 
of the model . If these conditions cannot be given a meaningful economic 
interpretation, it is worthwhile checking the original formulation of 
the model rather than imposing these conditions exogenously and estimating 
the parameters in the model subject to these conditions . 
34 
An interesting feature of the switching simultaneous systems 
is that is is possible to have underidentif ied systems in one of the 
regimes . As an illustration, consider the following model estimated 
by Avery (19 79 ) : 
D 
yl 
y2 
y 
' 
t\ xl + a.l y + ul 
' 
/32Xl + a.2D + u2 
s3x3 + a.3D + u3 
min (yl' y2) 
Demand for Durables (4 . 15 )  
Demand for Debt (4 .16)  
Supply of Deb t (4 . 17 ) 
Actual quantity of Debt (4 . 18)  
D, Y1, Y2 are the endogenous variables and x1 and x3 are
sets of exogenous variables . Note that the exogenous variables in the 
demand for durables equation and the demand for debt equation are the 
same . 
The model is a switching simulteneous equations model with 
endogenous switching . We can write the model as follows : 
Regime 1 :  yl < Yz Regime 2 : Yz < yl 
' ' 
D = S1x1 + a.1Y + u1 D = /31Xl + a.lY + ul 
' I 
y = /32� + a.2D + Uz y = i33X3 + a.3D + U3 
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If we get the reduced forms for Y1 and Y2 in the two regimes 
and simplify the expression Y1 - 'Y2 , we find that : 
(Y1 - Y2) in Regime 2 
1 - ala.3 ---- { (Y1 - Y2) in Regime l} Ci.1C12 
(4 . 19 )
Thus , the condit ion for the logical consistency o f  this model i s  that 
(1 - a1a2) and (1 - a1a3) are of the same sign - a condition that can 
also be derived by using the theorems in Gourieroux et al (19 78) . 
The interesting thing to note is that the simultaneous equa-
tion system in Regime 1 is under-identified . However, if the system 
of equations in Regime 2 is identified, the fact that we can get con-
sistent estimates of the parameters in the demand equation for durables 
from regime 2 , enables us to get consistent estimates of the parameters 
in the Y1 equation. Thus the parameters in the simultaneous equations 
system in Regime 1 are identified. One can construct a formal and 
rigorous proof but this will not be attempted here . Avery (1979) found 
that he could not estimate the parameters of the structural equation 
for Y1 but this is possibly due to the estimation methods used . 
The likelihood function for this model is 
L IT [�:D ,Y,Y2 ) dY2 + f(D , .,, Y) dYl] (4. 20) 
where f (D, Y1 , Y2) is the joint density of D , Yr, Y2 derived from equations 
(4 . 15) - (4 . 17 ) . 
The ML estimation of this model is not much difficult than 
the two-stage estimation. The two-stage estimation involves the 
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following steps: 
(i) Write equations (4 . 16) and (4. 17) in their reduced form and 
estimate these with equation (4. 18) using the ML method. 
However, note that the residuals in these reduced forms 
are correlated even if the residuals in the structural 
equations are not .  
(ii) Next , obtain consistent estimates Y1,and Y2 o f  Y1 and Y2 
from the estimates of these reduced form equations . Also , 
·2 � -let o1, o2 and ')_2 be the estimates of the variances and 
(iii) 
(iv) 
covariance between the res iduals in these reduced forms . 
Then a consistent estimate of Y is 
Y = AY + (1 - A)Y - o � (Yl - Y2) 1 2 'i' 
0 
where A � ryl = y2� 
a 
(4 . 21) 
� (·) and ijl (•) are respectively the distribut ion function and 
the density function of the s tandard normal, and 
-2 0 -2 01 + 
-2 02 - 2 012 (4 . 22 ) 
Substitute Y in (4 .15)  and estimate it by OLS . This gives the 
two-stage estimates of the parameters in (4 . 15 ) . 
Next , obtain a consistent estimate D of D and re-estimate 
the equations (4. 16) to 4.18) by ML using the same procedure 
as in step (i) . 
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This procedure gives consistent estimates of all the structural 
parameters . The major problem with this procedure is that the standard 
errors obtained in the second stage are not the correct standard errors . 
Further,  the derivation of the correct asymptotic covariance matrix of 
the two-stage estimates is much more involved than the derivation in 
Lee, et al. (1980) which is for the switching simultaneous system with 
known sample separation. In view of all this , and the fact that the 
two-step procedure itself involves the use of the ML Procedure twice , 
it is preferable to estimate this model by the ML method . The paper by 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1975 ) demonstrates the feasibility of the ML 
estimation procedure in such models . 
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There are also SJfil� switching simultaneous equations models 
where a variable is endogenous in one regime and exogenous in another 
and , unlike the cases considered by Richard (1978) and Davidson (1978) , 
the switching is endogenous . An example is the disequilibrium model 
in Maddala (1979) which will be discussed in a later section. 
5 .  DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELS : DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
Econometric estimation of disequilibrium models has a long 
history . The partial adjustment models are all disequilibrium models 
and in fact this is the type of model that the authors had in mind 
when they talked of "disequilibrium model. '' Some illustrative examples 
of this are Rosen and Nadiri (1974) , and Jonson and Taylor (1977) . 
The recent literature on disequilibrium econometrics 
considers a different class of models and has a different structure. 
These models are more properly called "rationing models . "  This 
literature started with the paper by Fair and Jaffee (1972) . The 
basic equation in their models is 
Qt = Min (Dt , St) (5 . 1) 
where Qt = quantity transacted
Dt = quantity demanded 
st = quantity supplied . 
Fair and Jaffee considered two classes of models 
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(i) Directional models : In these we inf er whether Qt is
equal to Dt or St based on the direction of price
movement , i.e . ,  
Dt > St and hence Qt st if �Pt > o 
Dt < S t and hence Qt = Dt 
if �pt< 0 
where �p t pt - pt-1• 
and (ii) Quantitative models : In these the price change is 
proportional to excess demand (or supply) , i . e . , 
pt - pt-1 = y (Dt - St) .  (5 . 2) 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the quantitative model 
is discussed in Amemiya (19 74a) . The maximum likelihood estimation of 
the directional model , and models with s tochastic sample separation 
(i. e . , where only (5 . 1) is used or (5 . 2) is stochastic) is discussed 
in Maddala and Nelson (1974) . 
The directional method is logically incons istent since the 
condition that �t gives information on sample separation implies that 
Pt is endogenous , in which case there are not enough equations to deter­
mine the endogenous variables Qt and Pt . We will , therefore , discuss
only models with the price determination equation (5 . 2 ) included. One 
can then use two-stage least squares methods to estimate these models . 
Suppose the demand and supply funct ions are specified as : 
I 
Dt = Sl�lt + alPt + ult
S t = s2x2t + a2Pt + u2t 
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Then, Fair and Jaffee (19 72 ) note that we can derive the 
following equation: 
For �pt > 0 ,  we know from (5 . 2) that Dt > St. Hence St Qt and we have: 
I 
Qt S2X2t + a2Pt + ult
Also equation (5 . 2) can be written as Qt 
1 Qt = 81�t + alPt + ult -y�Pt 
(A) 
D -· l�P . Hence we have t - t y 
(B) 
Similarly, for �pt < O we have Dt < St and hence Dt = Qt . 
Thus , 
I 
Qt = SlXlt + alPt + ult
Also writing equation (5 . 2) as Qt 
1 st - y�pt we get 
Qt 
I 1 S2X2t + a2Pt + u2 t - y�Pt 
Compining equations (B) and (B ' ) we get 
where 
I 1 Qt = alxlt + al Pt + y2lt + ult
2it = f - � t if �Pt > 0 
1 0 if �t < 0 '-
(B ' ) 
(A') 
(C) 
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Similarly, comb ining (A) and (A') we get 
1 Qt = S2X2 t + a2Pt + y-z2t + u2t (D) 
where z,, � 0 if ••, > 0 
- ��t if �pt < 0. 
Amemiya (1974a) suggests the following two-stage es timation 
method: Regress Pt, Zlt' z2t on all the exogenous variables (using all 
the observations) . Substitute the estimated Pt, Zlt' z2t in equations 
(C) and (D) and estimate these by OLS. The resulting two s tage estimates 
can be shown to be consistent. 
We need not go through the algebraic details of the ML 
methods . What we need to discuss is the adequacy of the basic 
equations . First of all, the condition (5-1) is valid in only 
"rationing models" of disequilibrium i.e . if there is excess demand, 
the supply is "rationed out" to the demanders, and similarly, if 
there is excess supply, the available demand is "rationed out" to 
the suppliers . As to how this is accomplished, is not usually 
specified or discussed . The second point is that, there is no 
reason why the direction of price movement �t should give any 
information on excess demand or excess supply . One can visualize 
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shifts in the demand and supply functions (produced by changes in 
exogenous variables) such that Pt+l > Pt and still there is excess
supply in period (t+l) . Thus, equation (5 . 2) is hard to 
j ustify, though we will describe one set of conditions under which 
it makes sense .  As for the quantitative method, suppose we argue, 
as Fair and Jaffee did, that if there is excess demand, prices 
rise and if there is excess supply , prices fall. The question, 
however, is when? In this case it may be more meaningful to 
substitute liPt+l 
= Pt+l - Pt for liPt in equation (
5 . 2) so that we 
have 
�pt + 1 y(Dt - St) (5 . 2') 
This is what Laffont and Garcia (1977) do. What this does to the 
estimation of the model is that P t is exogenous and not endogenous 
at time t .  Laffont and Garcia also allow for different speeds of 
price adj ustment for periods of excess demand and excess supply in 
their quantitative methods. In their re-formulation equation (5 . 2') 
is written as 
Mt+l Y1 (Dt St) if Dt > S t 
= Y2 (Dt - St) if Dt < st (5.3)
The method of estimation does not change much with these re-formulations . 
The only difference is that there is one extra parameter . We can 
derive the likelihood function for this model following the procedure 
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used by Amemiya (l974a) for the Fair and Jaffee model . The only thing 
to note is that Pt is exogenous and it is now Pt+l that is endogenous . 
Let f1 (Qt,Pt+l) and f2 (Qt ,Pt+l) 
be the j oint densities of Qt and Pt+l 
when Qt = Dt and Qt 
Q = D t t 
St respectively . To derive f1 note that 
Sl�t + a.lPt + ult
and pt+l - Pt = Y2
(Dt - St) = Y2 (Qt - e2x2t - a.2Pt - u2t) 
These equations can be written as 
- Q - o �x - Ci. p ult - t µl lt · 1 t 
= Q - e�x - <a. -
.!.__) P  - ! P u2t t 2 2t 2 Y2 t y2 t + 1 
cs , 4) 
The Jacobian of the transformation from (ult ' u2t) to Qt ' Pt+l) is 
�
2 
Hence f1(Qt ' Pt+l) = �2 g1(u1, u2) and we substitute the expressions 
in (5 . 4) in the observed variables . 
The derivat ion of f2 is similar. We have 
Qt = St = S2X2t + a.2Pt + u2t 
and 
pt+l - pt = yl
(Dt - St) Y1(SlXlt + a.lPt + ult - Qt
) 
These equations can be written as : 
ult Qt - e1x1t 
1 1 (Ci. - -) p - - p 1 y1 t y1 t+l 
u2t = Qt - S2X2t - a.2P t 
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The Jacobian of the transformation from (ult ' u2 t) to (Qt' Pt+l
) is �
l 
Hence 1 f2(Qt ,Pt+l) = � g2 (ul , u2) 1 
where g2 (u1 , u2) is the density of (u1 , u2) with the expressions in 
(5 . 5) substituted for u1 and u2 . 
Finally, the likelihood function to be maximized is : 
L = TI llPt+l<
O 
fl(Qt ,Pt+l) TI l::,p 
f 2 (Q ' p ) 
t+l >
O t t+l 
Thus , the likelihood function and estimation problems are not 
much altered by making the alternative assumptions in equations (5 . 3) 
instead of (S . 2) 3 . 
Though the modifications of the price-adj ustment equations 
suggested by Laffont and Garcia given by equations (5 . 3) make sense,  
there is an alternative interpretation of the price adj ustment 
equation that one can think of under which equation (5 . 2) is more 
meaningful . This interpretation actually goes to the root of the 
question as to why disequilibrium exists at all .  
Let P� be the price that equilibrates demand and supply . If 
there are no costs of price adjustment, then Pt = P� and we have an 
equilibrium model . On the other hand if firms cannot adjust prices 
immediately (even though they know the market clearing price) , we have 
a partial adj ustment model : 
Hence 
P - P = A (P* - P ) t t-1 t t-1 
=A (P� - Pt + Pt - Pt-1) 
A p - P = - (P* - p ) • t t-1 1-A t t 
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O<A<l (5 . 6) 
(5 . 7)
If Pt < P� there will be excess demand and if Pt > P� there will be
excess supply . Hence,  if 6Pt<O we have a situation of excess supply . 
Note that in this case it is /:;pt (not /:;pt+l as in the Laffont­
Garcia case) that gives the sample separation . But the interpretation 
is not that prices rise in response to excess demand (as implicitly
argued by Fair and Jaffee) but that there is excess demand (or excess
supply) because prices do not fully adjust to the equilibrating 
values . 4 
Equation (5 . 7 ) can also be written as
pt - pt-1 = y (Dt - St) ( 5 . 8 )
i f  we assume that the excess demand (Dt - St) i s  proportional t o  the 
difference (P� - Pt) ' i . e . , the difference between the equilibrating
price and the actual price.  The interpretation of the coefficient y in 
(5 . 8) is of course different from what Fair and Jaffee gave to the 
same equation . 
Thus , there are two interpretations of the price adjustment 
equations that one can think of : 
(i) Prices rise or fall in response to excess demand or supply . 
Here the formulation of Laffont and Garcia using liPt+l makes 
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more sense than the formulation of Fair and Jaffee
using /:;pt " 
(ii) Excess demand or excess supply exist because prices do
not adj ust fully (due to costs of adj ustment) to the 
equilibrium level . Here the formulation of Fair and 
Jaffee makes more sense than that of Laffont and Garcia . 
Different speeds of upward and downward adj ustment as in 
equation (5 . 4) can also be derived in the partial adjustment 
framework. Consider the following formulation : 
pt - pt-1 Al (P� - Pt-1) if P� > Pt-1 
A (P* - P ) if P* < P 2 t t-1 t t-1
These equations imply
Al P - P = -- (P* - P ) if P* > P • t t-1 l-A1 t t t t 
A2 
= -- (P* - P ) if P* < P . l-A2 t t t t 
(5 . 9) 
(5 . 10)
Note first that the conditions P� > Pt-l ' Pt > Pt-l ' P� > Pt and Dt > 
St are all equivalent . Also assuming that excess demand is proportional 
to P� - Pt we can write equations (5 . 10) as 
/:;pt y1 (Dt - St) if Dt > St 
= y (D 2 t St) if Dt < St 
Again note that we get t:;·pt and not 6 Pt+l in these equations . 
Ito and Ueda (1979) use Bowden ' s  formulation with different
speeds of adjustment as given by (5 . 9) to estimate the rates of
4 7
adj ustment in interest rates for business loans in the U . S. and Japan. 
They prefer this formulation to that of Fair and Jaffee or Laffont 
and Garcia because in equation (5. 9) ,  Al and A2 are pure numbers
which can be compared across countries. The same cannot be said 
about the parameters y1 and y2 in equation (5 . 4) . 
There is still one disturbing feature about the partial 
adjustment equation ( 5 . 6 )  that Bowden adopts and under which we have 
given a j ustification for the Fair and Jaffee directional and 
quantitative methods. This is that �pt unambiguously gives us an 
idea about whether there is excess demand or excess supply . As 
mentioned earlier this does not make intuitive sense. On closer 
examination one sees that the problem is with equation (5 . 6) ,  in 
particular the assumption that A lies between 0 and 1 .  This is 
indeed a very strong assumption and implies that prices are sluggish 
but never change to overshoot P� the equilibrium prices . There is, 
however , no apriori reason why this should happen . Once we drop the 
assumption that A should lie between 0 and 1 ,  it is no longer true 
that we can use �t to classify observations as belonging to excess
demand or excess supply . As noted earlier the assumption O<A<l 
implies that the conditions P� > Pt-l' Pt > Pt-l' P� > Pt and Dt > St 
are all equivalent . With A>l , this no longer holds good . 
To see the full implications of the partial adjustment equa-
* 
tion ( 5 . 6) , define Qt as the quantity that wo
uld be transacted if the 
market were to be in equilibrium. Consider the situation in Figure 1 
where the supply function SS is stable but the demand function shifts 
to the left . 
* * * * 
Then pt < pt - 1 and Qt < Qt - l "
48
As for Pt _ 1 , we do not
really know whether at time (t - 1) , the market was in equilibrium or 
* 
not . But for any value of Pt _ 1 between X and Pt , the value of Qt _ 1 
* * 
would be greater than Qt but les s than Qt _ 1 • As for Qt , a partial
adjus tment model for Pt given by (5 .6)  will trace out points along YZ 
* and so Qt would be less than Qt . Thus the partial adjustment equation
for prices given by ( 5 . 6 )  implies a quant ity adj ustment equation. 
Qt - Qt-1 µ(Q� - Qt-l ) where µ > 1 .
* 
(5 . 11) 
Of course in this particular case if Pt _ 1 were to be < Pt then the
value of µ in the quantity adj ustment equation (5 . 11) also satisfies 
0 < µ < 1 .  But we can show that anything is possible for the parameter µ 
in the quantity adjustment equation (5 . 11) . 
If Qt and Pt are both s imultaneously determined. as the model
says they are , then it is inconsistent to have a price adjustment equa-
tion of the form ( 5 . 6 )  in isolation that leads to a quantity adjustment 
equation of the form ( 5 . 11) . The solution out of this dilemma is either 
to drop the minimum condition (5 . 1) or drop the assumpt ion that Pt is 
endogenous . If one has a market clearing model , of course one should no t 
consider equation ( 5 . 1) in the first place. But if one is dealing with 
a rationing model , then one has to live with condition (5 . 1) . The logical 
thing then is to drop equation ( 5 . 6 ) . Obviously , equation (5 . 6 )  itself 
implies that prices are being "adj usted" or set by someone. If this 
is the case,  Pt has to be exogenous and a price "adj ustment" equation' 
like (5 . 2  ) suggested by Laffont and Garcia is more reasonable. But
the proper way to look at this equation is 
Price Dt - 1 
x 
_ _ _ _ \_, _ _  � 
p
* 
t - l,_ - - - - - - - - - -
* 
pt 
s 
* 
Qt 
* 
Qt - 1 
Figure 1 
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s 
Dt - 1 
Dt 
Quantity
' as a forecast equation for future prices, in which case equation (5. 2 ) 
needs some further thinking. The source of disequilibrium now is not 
imperfect "adj ustment" of prices but imperfect forecasts of market 
equilibrating prices.
6 .  DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELS : CONTROLLED PRICES AND "RATIONING" VS . 
"TRADING" MODELS.
The most important criticism one can level against the 
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econometric literature on disequilibrium is that there is usually no 
discussion of why disequilibrium exists in the first place.  There 
are two maj or sources of disequilibrium:
(1) Imperfect adj ustment of prices
(2) Controlled prices
In the previous section we discussed the case of imperfect adjustment 
to the market equilibrating price . In this section we will discuss
the case of controlled prices . 
The case of controlled prices is different from the case
of fixed prices . The disequilibrium model considered earlier in 
example 1 , section 1 is one with fixed prices . With fixed prices , 
the market is almost always in disequilibrium .  With controlled
prices , the market is sometimes in equilibrium and sometimes in
disequilibrium. 
Consider the following model : 
Dt = XltSl + alPt + ult
St = X2tS2 + a2Pt + u2t
Dt is quantity demanded.
st is quantity supplied . 
Pt is price . 
x1t and x2t are explanatory variables . 
u1t and u2t are residuals which are only 
contemporaneously correlated.
( 6 . 1) 
(6 . 2) 
Let Pt be controlled to lie between Plt and P2t . i . e .  Plt < Pt < P2t"
There are several examples of this . In the case of natural gas 
P2t is the price-ceiling. There is no price-floor and hence P1t
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In the case of price supports for agricultural commodities , Plt is
the price-floor . There is no price-ceiling . Hence P"2t = "°· In the
case of commodity futures markets ,  there are both lower and upper
limits for the price variation.
In all these models , if the equilibrating price is within 
"°· 
the specified limits , we have equilibrium and the quantity transacted , 
Qt ' is given by Dt = St = Qt . In this case both Pt and Qt are 
endogenous variables . If the price falls outside the specified lilllits , 
Pt is exogenous and we have disequilibrium. We thus have a switching 
simultaneous system where Pt is sometimes endogenous and sometimes 
exogenous . Earlier, Barten and Bronsard (1970) derived some two-stage 
least squares estimators for the case where a regressor may be 
exogenous or endogenous at different times. Richard (1978) studied
some wider aspects of this problem and Davidson (1978) derived the
exact maximum likelihood estimators for a fairly general class of
models involving shifts between the endogenous and exogenous variables . 
But the switching between regimes considered in these papers is 
exogenous rather than endogenous as in the model we are considering . 
It is a consequence of some abrupt institutional changes or policy
changes like shifts from fixed to floating echange rates . Shifts in 
Federal Reserve policy from manipulation of interest rates to control
of money supply etc . By contrast ,  the switch in our model is
produced by controls in the market equilibrating pric e .
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We can classify the observations into three regimes : 
Regime 1 :  plt 
< pt
< p2t " Denote this set of points by �1 . 
These are the equilibrium points and Qt and Pt are 
both endogenous . 
Regime 2 :  Pt � P2t . Denote this set of points by �2 . As 
to what happens to Qt depends on whether we are
considering a "rationing model" or a "trading model . "
In the case of natural gas , Qt = St and Dt � Qt . 
Also P2t is an exogenous variable . In "trading 
models , "  since no trading takes place Qt = O .
Regime 3 :  Pt � P1t . Denote this set by �3 . This
 set corresponds 
to excess supply. As to what happens to Qt depends on 
the type of model we are considering . In "rationing 
models , "  we have Qt = Dt ' St � Qt and Plt is exogenous . 
In the case of agricultural price supports ,  we observe 
both Dt and St in this regime since we know the market 
demand and the surplus purchased by the government . In 
the case of "trading models , "  since no trading takes 
place,  we have Qt = O .
The appropriate likelihood functions for the different classes o f  models
are as follows : 
For a model with price-ceiling and "rationing" the likelihood function
is : 
L II f (Qt ,P t) �l 
II 
�2 
00 f g (Dt , Qt) dDt (6 . 3) 
Qt 
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where f (Qt , Pt) is the j oint density of Qt and Pt derived from the 
j oint density of u1 ,u2) as in any simultaneous equations model , and 
g (Dt , St) is the j oint density of Dt and St derived from the j oint 
density of (u1 , u2) treating Pt = Pt and exogenous . Note that the 
j acobian of transformation for f (Qt , Pt) is l a1 - a2 1 which is 
expected to be nonzero since a1 and a2 are of opposite signs and 
nonzero . The jacobian of transformation for g (Dt , St) is , of course ,
unity . 
For a model with price supports as in agricultural commodity 
programs (no rationing) the likelihood function is : 
L = II f (Qt ,P t) ljil 
II g (D , St) ljJ t 3 
where f (Qt ,Pt ) is as defined in (6 . 3) and g (Dt , St) is the j oint 
density of Dt and St derived from the j oint density of (u1 ,u2) 
treating Pt P1t as exogenous. 
( 6 . 4) 
For a model with both price ceilings and price floor , and 
"rationing , "  the likelihood function is 
L = II f(Qt ,P t)
. II 
ljil ljJ2 
00 fg2 (Dt ,Qt) dDt . II 
Q ljJ3 Jg: (Qt , S t
) dSt 
Q (6 . 5) 
where g1 and g2 are the j oint densities of Dt and St derived from (1) 
and (2) after substituting Pt P2t respectively.
For a "trading" model where no transactions take place if 
there is excess demand or excess supply, the likelihood function is : 
L II f ( Qt' P t ) ljil 
II 
�}2 
00 
J g (Pt) dPt 
p2t 
II 
ljJ3 
�lt 
J g (P t) dPt 
-00 
( 6. 6 ) 
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where g (Pt) is the distribution of the equilibrium price Pt , i . e . , the 
distribution of Pt derived from the reduced form equation for Pt implied
by the structural equations (6 . 1) and (6 . 2 ) .  
In practice, with commodity trading, there will be a series of 
trades that take place at different prices within the admissible range 
P1t S Pt S P"2t . In this case all we observe is Qt (the total volume of 
trading) and all we know was that price Pt was within the admissible range . 
In this case, the first term in the likelihood function (6 . 6) should be 
changed to : 
p � f 2t 
p lt 
f(Qt , Pt ) dPt 
Note that here we have a simultaneous equations model with two endogenous 
variables Pt and Qt . Qt is ob served only if Pt is within a specified range 
and Pt is observed only in a qualitative way - which of the three different
sets it belongs to. The parameters of the demand and supply functions 
(6 .1)  and (6 . 2) can be estimated with these data . 
Further details of estimation, two stage methods , and estima-
tion of the market equilibrating price if controls are removed are dis-
cussed in Maddala (19 79 )  and will not be repeated here . 
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7. TESTS FOR DISEQUILIBRIUM : 
There have been many tests suggested for the "disequilibrium 
hypothesis" i. e . ,  to test whether the data have been generated by an 
equilibrium model or a disequilibrium model . Quandt (1978) discusses 
several tests and says that there does not exist a uniformly best 
procedure for testing the hypothesis that a market is in equilibrium 
against the alternative that it is not. 
A good starting point for "all" tests for disequilibri= is 
to ask the basic question of what the disequilibril.llll is due to . In 
the case of the partial adj ustment model given by equation (5 . 7 ) , the 
disequilibrium is clearly due to imperfect adj ustment of prices . In 
this case the proper test for the equilibrium vs . disequilibril.llll 
hypothesis is to test whether A = 1. As discussed in section 5 ,  this 
leads to a 
since y is 
test that ! = 0 in the Fair and Jaffee quantitative model , y 
. 1 1 proportiona to l-A · This is the procedure Fair and Jaffee
suggest . However, if the meaning of the price adj ustment equation is 
that prices adjust in response to either excess demand or excess 
supply , then as argued in Section 5, the price adj ustment equation 
should have �pt+l not �Pt , and also it is not clear how one can test
for the equilibril.llll hypothesis in this case. The intuitive reason is 
that now the price adjustment equation does not give any information 
about the source of the disequilibrium. 
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Quandt (1978) argues that there are two classes of 
disequilibrium models which are : 
(a) Models where it is known for which observations Dt < St 
and for which Dt > St i.e., the sample separation is
known, and 
(b) Models in which such information is not available . 
He says that in case (a) the question of testing for 
disequilibrium does not arise at all . It is only in case (b) that 
it makes sense.  
The example of the partial adjustment model (5 . 7 )  is a 
case where we have sample separation given by �Pt . However , it
still makes sense to test for the disequilibri= hypothesis which 
in this case merely translates to a hypothesis about the speed of 
adj ustment of prices to levels that equilibrate demand and supply . 
Adding a stochastic term u3t to the price adjustment equation does
not change the test . When A=l this says Pt = Pt +  u3t . 
There is considerable discussion in Quandt ' s  paper on the 
question of nested vs . non-nested hypothesis . Quandt argues that 
very often the hypothesis of equilibri= vs . disequilibrium is 
non-nested i . e .  the parameter set under the null hypothesis that 
the model is an equilibrium model is not a subset of the parameter 
set for the disequilibrium model . The problem in these cases may 
be that there is no adequate explanation of why disequilibrium exists 
in the first place . 
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Consider for ins tance ,  the disequilibrium model : with the 
demand and supply functions specified by equations (6 . 1) and (6 . 2) . 
Quandt argues that if one takes the limit of the likelihood
function for this model with price adjustment equation as : 
.ti.Pt = y (Dt - St) + u3t (7 . 1) 
and a23 = Cov(u2 , u3) = 0 
cr13 = Cov(u1 , u3) = 0 
2 a3 -:f. o 
and y + oo
then we get the likelihood function for the equilibrium model
(Qt Dt = St) and thus the hypothesis is "nested " ;  but that if 
cr3
2 = 0, the likelihood function for the disequilibrium model does
not tend to the likelihood function for the equilibrium model even 
if y + oo and thus the hypothesis is not nested. The latter
conclusion, however , is counter-intuitive and if we consider the 
correct likelihood function for this model derived in Amemiya (1974)
and if we take the limits as y + 00 ,  we get the likelihoo d  function for
the equilibrium model . 
Quandt also shows that if the price adjustment equation is
changed to
�pt +  1 .= _y(Dt - St) +  u3t (7 . 2) 
then the limit of the likelihood function of the disequilibrium model
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as y + 00 is not the likelihood function for the equilibrium model . 
This makes intuitive sense and is also clear when we look at the 
likelihood functions derived in section 5 .  In this case the 
hypothesis is nonnested , but the problem is that as discussed
earlier , this price adj ustment equation does not tell us anything 
about what disequilibrium is due to • .  As shown iu - section 5 ,  the 
price adjustment equation (7 . 1) follows from the partial adjustment 
equation (5 . 7 )  and thus throws light on what disequilibrium is due 
to , but the price adj ustment equation (7 . 2) says nothing about the 
source of the disequilibrium . If we view the equation as a forecast
equation, then the disequilibrium is due to · imperfect forecasts of the 
market equilibrating price. In this case it is clear that. as y + 00 ,
we do not get perfect forecasts.  What we need to have a nested model
is a forecasting eqDation ·which for some limiting values of some 
parameters yields perfect forecasts at the market equilibrating prices.
Consider now the case where we do not have a price adjustment 
equation and the model merely consists of a demand equation and a 
supply equation . Now, clearly the source of the disequilibrium is
that Pt is exogenous . Hence the test boils down to testing whether 
Pt is exogenous or endogenous. The methods developed by Wu (1973)
and Hausman (1978) would be of use here.
In summary , tests for disequilibrium should be based on a dis-
cussion of the source of disequilibrium. The test would then be a test
of a nested hypothesis , and what the appropriate test is would be obvious
from a statement of the problem.
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8 . MULTIMARKET DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
The analysis in the preceeding sections on single market 
disequilibrium models has been extended to multimarket disequilibrium 
models by Gourieroux et . al .  (1980) and Ito (1980) . Quandt (197 6) 
first considered a two-market disequilibrium model of the following 
form: (the exogenous variables are omitted) : 
Dlt = al Q2t + Ult
slt = 81 Q2t + u2t 
D2t = a2 Qlt + Vlt 
s2t = 82 Qlt + v2t 
Qlt = Min (Dlt ' slt) 
Q2t = Min (D2t ' s2t) 
(8 . 1) 
(8 . 2) 
Quandt did not consider the logical
 consistency of the model. This 
is considered in Amemiya (1977 ) and Gourieroux et
. al .  (1978) .
Consider the regimes : 
Rl : Dl � Sl 
. D2 :::-; S 2 
R2 : Dl � S l D2 < S 2 (8 . 3) 
R3 : Dl < S l D2 < 
S 2 
R4 : Dl < S2 D2 � 
S2 
In regime 1 ,  we have Q1 = s1 , Q2 
= s2 and substituting the
se in 
( 8 . 1) we have 
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Al I 
Dl = 1 0 0 -all I Dl I = I u1 
sl 0 1 0 -:, j l:: j lu2 D2 I 1 0 -a2 1 u3 s2 J LO -82 0 U4 
Similarly , we can define the corresponding matrices A2 , A3 , A4 in 
regimes R2 , R3 , R4 respectively that giv
e the mapping from 
(D1 , s1 , D2 , s2) to (u1 , u2 , 
u3 , u4) .
1 0 -al 0 1 1 0 -al 0 
A2 A = 0 1 -81 : J 3 0 1 -81 0 0 -a2 1 -a2 0 1 0 0 -82 0 -82 0 0 1 
� 
and A4 1 0 0 -al 
0 1 0 -81 
-a2 0 1 0 
-82 0 0 1 
The logical consistency or ' coherency ' condit ions derived by 
Gourieroux et.al.  are that the determinants o f  these four matrices 
i . e .  (1-8182) ,  (l-a281) ,  (l-a1a2) ,  (l-a182) must be the same sign . 
The maj or problem that the multi.market disequilibrium models 
are supposed to throw light on (which the models in equations (8 . 1) and 
(8 . 2) does not) refers to the "spill-over effects" -- the effects of 
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unsatisfied demand or supply in one market on the demand and supply 
in other markets . Much of this discussion on spill-over effects
has been in the context of macro-models , the two markets considered
are the commodity market and the labor market . The commodity is
supplied by producers and consumed by households . Labor is supplied
by households and used by producers . The quantities actually 
transacted are given by
C = Min (Cd , Cs) 
L = Min (Ld , Ls) 
(8 . 4) 
The demands and supplies actually presented in each market are called
"effective" demands and supplies and these are determined by the
exogenous variables and the endogenous quantity constraints (8 . 4) . 
By contrast , the "notional" demands and supplies refer to the 
unconstrained values.  - d  -s -d -s Denote these by C , C , L , L . The different 
models of multi-market disequilibrium differ in the way ' effective ' 
demands and "spill-over effects" are defined . Gourieroux et . al .
(1980) define the effective demands and ' spill-over effects ' as 
follows : 
Model I :
Cd = Cd 
-d - s = C + a1 (L - L )
Cs = c;s 
-s -d = C + a2 (L - L ) 
if L = Ls ::0 Ld 
if L = Ld < Ls 
if L = Ld ::: Ls 
if L = L
s < Ld 
( 8 . 5 )
(8 . 6) 
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Ld = � if C = Cs ::: Cd 
= � + 13 (C - °CS) if C = Cd < Cs 1 
(8 . 7)
Ls = 
L5
if C = Cd ::: Cs 
= L5 + 13 (C - crl) if C = Cs < Cd 2 
( 8 . 8 )
This specification i s  based on Clower (1965) and Malinvand (197 7 )  and 
assumes that agents on the short-side of the market present their
notional demand as their effective demand in the other market . For 
instance equation (8 . 5) says that if households are able to sell all
the labor they want to,  then their effective demand for goods is the
same as their ' notional ' demand . On the other hand , if they cannot
sell all the labor they want to , there is a "spill-over effect" but 
note that this is proportional to L - L5 not L - Ls . ( i . e .  it is
proportional to the difference between actual labor sold and the
' notional ' supply of labor) . 
The model considered by Ito (1980) is as follows : 
Model I I :
Cd = c1 + a1 (L - i5)
Cs = °CS + a2 (L - �)
Ld = � + 13 (C - °CS) 1 
Ls = 
L5 
+ 13 (C - crl)2 
(8 . 5 ' )
(8 . 6 ' )
(8 . 7 ' )
(8 . 8 ' )
An alternative model suggested by Portes (1977) based on work by 
Benassy is the following : 
Model III : 
Cd = crl + a (L - Ls) 1 
s -::s d C = C + az (L - L ) 
Ld = r;tl + S1 (c - C
s) 
Ls = L5 + S (C - Cd) z 
6 3
(8 . 5 ") 
(8 . 6")
(8 .  71 1)
(8 . 8")  
Portes compares the reduced forms for these three models and argues 
that econometrically , there is little to choose between the alternative 
definitions of effective demand . 
The conditions for logical consistency (or coherency) are 
the same in all these models viz : O<a . S . <l for i , j  = l , Z . 1 J Both
Gourieroux et . al .  (1980) and Ito (1980) derive these conditions , 
suggest price and wage adjustment equations similar to those 
considered in Section 5 ,  and discuss the maximum likelihood estimation 
of their models . Ito also discusses two-stage estimation similar 
to that proposed by Amemiya for the Fair and Jaffee model , and derives 
sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a quantity-constrained 
equilibrium in his model . We cannot go into the details of all these 
derivations here.  The details involve more of algebra than any new 
conceptual problems in estimation . In particular , the problems 
mentioned in Section 5 about the different price adj ustment equations 
apply here as well . There is as yet no empirical example illustrating 
the estimation of these multi-market disequilibrium models . There 
is , on the other hand , an enormous amount of theoretical literature 
in this area . One maj or problem, from the empirical point of view is 
that the discussion of the multi-market disequilibrium models has 
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been entirely in the context of a macro-model . Thus , when people 
think of an empirical application, they think only of a macro-model . 
One can consider spill-over effects in other models as well . 
For instance ,  consider two commodities which are substitutes 
in consumption (say natural gas and coal) one of which has price 
controls . We can define the demand and suppl� functions in the two 
markets (omitting the exogenous variables) as follows : 
Dl = al 1 + Sl P z + ul 
sl = aZPl + uz 
Ql = Min (D1 , S1) 
(8 . 9) 
pl :::: p 
Dz Y1Pz + olPl + A (Dl - Sl) + vl 
sz YzPz + vz 
QZ = DZ = Sz i . e .  the second market is always in equilibrium.
If P1 :::: P, we have the usual simultaneous equations model with the
two quantities and two prices as the endogenous variables . If P1 > P , 
then there is excess demand in the first market and a spill-over of 
this into the second market .  This model i s  still in a "partial 
equilibrium" framework but would have interesting empirical 
applications . It is at least one step forward from the single-market 
disequilibrium model which does not say what happens to the 
unsatisfied demand or supply . 
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In actual practice the unsatisfied demand spills over to
other markets .  But it will also ' spill over ' into future trading
sessions of the same market .  This implies that the demand function
is of the form:
Dt = 8iXt + a (Dt-l-st-1) + ut. 
Models that consider such " inter-temporal" spill-overs are , however , 
more difficult to estimate than those that consider contemporaneous 
spill-overs into other markets .
9 . MODELS WITH SELF-SELECTIVITY 
There are many problems where the data we have are generated 
by individuals making choices of belonging to one group or the other 
(i . e. by individuals ' self-selection) . An early discussion of this 
problem of self-selectivity is in Roy (195 1) who discusses the problem 
of individuals choosing between two professions : hunting and fishing , 
based on their productivity in each . The observed distribution of 
incomes of hunters and fishermen is determined by these choices . 
Suppose Yli is the output of the i-th individual in 
hunting and Y2i the output in fishing . Individual i will choose to
be a hunter if Yli > Y2i . 
means 
Assume that (Y1Y2) have a j oint normal distribution with 
(µ1 , µ2) and covariance matrix ( 2 crl 
012 
01�\ 
02 I 
Define ul yl µl 
U2 = y2 - ].12 
µ1-µ2 Z = -0- and 
u2-ul u = 0 
rl 
The condition Y1 > Y2 implies u < z .
The mean income of hunters is given by 
E (Y1 i u<Z) = 
¢ (Z)
µ1-01u cJ? (Z)
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Var (u1 - u2) 
(9 . 1) 
Where o1u = Cov(u1 ,u) and ¢ ( • )  and cJ? ( • )  are respectively the density
function and the distribution function of the standard normal� The
mean income of fishermen is given by 
where 
Since
E (Y2 l u>Z) = µ2 + 0 
lliL
2u 1-cJ? (Z) 
o2u = Cov(u2 ,u) . 
2 
012-01 
o = --- and o = lu o 2u 
2 
02 -012 
0 
( 9 . 2) 
we have o2u-olu>O.
We can now consider different cases . 
Case (i)
o1u<O ,  o2u>O . In this case the mean income of hunters is > µ1 
and the mean income of fishermen is > µ2 i. e .  those who have 
chosen hunting are better than average hunters and those who 
have chosen fishing are better than average fishermen . 
Case (ii)
o1u<O ,  o2u<O. In this case the mean income of hunters is > µ1 
6 7  
and the mean income of fishermen is < µ2 . In this case those 
who chose hunting are better than average in both hunting and 
fishing but they are better in hunting than fishing . Those 
who chose fishing are below average in both hunting and fishing 
but they are better in fishing than hunting. 
Case (iii) 
crlu >O , cr2u>O .  This i s  the reverse case o f  case (ii) . 
Case (iv) 
cr1u>O, cr2u<O. This is not possible given the definitions of
cr1u and cr2u . 
Note that case (ii) typically occurs if cr1 is very large compared 
to cr2 . Thus the better skilled individuals go into the profession
with higher variance in earnings . 
More detailed analysis of this model can be found in Roy 
(1951 ) .  The important thing to note here is the importance of the 
covariance terms cr1u and cr2u in the interpretation of the results . 
We will see later how they play an important role in discussions of 
selectivity bias . 
The econometric discussion of the consequences of 
self-selectivity started with the papers by Gronau ( 1974) , Lewis 
(1974) and Heckman (1974) . In this case the problem is about women 
choosing to be in the labor force or not .  The observed dis tribution 
of wages is a truncated distribution. It is the distribution of 
wage offers truncated by reservation wages . The Gronau-Lewis model 
consisted of two equations : 
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Wo = Xi31 + ul 
wr + Xi32 + u2 
( 9 . 3) 
We observe W = W iff W � W o o r Otherwise W = O . We discussed
the estimation of this model in section 2 and we will not repeat it 
here. The term ' selec tivity bias ' refers to the fact that if we 
estimate equation (9 . 3) by OLS based on the observations for which 
we have wages W, we get inconsistent estimates of the parameters . 
Note that E (u1 1 w �w ) o r cr � lu <P(Z) 
Where Z 
Xi31-Xi32 
cr and the other terms are as defined earlier . 
Hence we can write (9 . 3) as : 
Where E (V)=O . 
¢(Z) + V W = Xi31-crlu <P(Z) ( 9 . 4) 
A test for selectivity bias is a test for cr1u=O. Heckman (1976)
suggested a two-stage estimation method for such models . First get 
consistent estimates for the parameters in Z by the probit method 
applied to the dichotomous variable (in the labor force or not) . 
Then estimate equation (9 . 4) by OLS using the estimated values z 
for Z .
The self-selectivity problem has since been analyzed in 
different contexts by several people . Lee (1978) has applied it to 
the problem of unions and wages . Lee and Trost (1978) have applied 
it to the problem of housing demand with choices of owning and 
renting . Willis and Rosen ( 1979) have applied the model to the 
problem of education and self-selection . These are all switching 
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regression models . Griliches et . al .  (1979) and Kenny et . al .  (1979) 
consider models with both selectivity and simultaneity . These 
models are switching simultaneous equations models . As for methods 
of estimation , both two-stage and maximum likelihood methods have 
been used . For two-stage methods ,  the paper by Lee et . al .  (1980) 
gives the asymptotic covariance matrices when the selectivity 
criterion is of the probit and tobit types . 
In the literature on self-selectivity a maj or concern has 
been with testing for selectivity bias . These are tests for cr1u=O 
and cr2u=O in equations of the form (9 . 1) and ( 9 . 2) . However , a more 
important issue is the sign and magnitude of these covariances and 
often not much attention is devoted to this . In actual practice we 
ought to have cr2u-crlu>O but cr1u and cr2u can have any signs . It is 
also important to estimate the mean values of the dependent variables 
for the alternate choice. For instance , in the case of college 
education and income , we should estimate the mean income of college 
graduates had they chosen not to go to college , and the mean income 
of non-college graduates had they chosen to go to college . In the 
example of hunting and fishing we should compute the mean income of 
hunters had they chosen to be fishermen and the mean income of 
fishermen had they chosen to be hunters . Such computations throw 
light on the effects of self-selection and also reveal deficiencies 
in the model which simple tests for the existence of selectivity bias 
do not .  
In the simplest two equation model given by equations 
(1 . 1) to (1 . 4) , if we denote by c1 and c2 the choices of groups 1 and 
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2 respectively, we have: 
I _ cjJ (Za) . _ E (uj c1) - - crj u  � (Za) J - 1 , 2  
I _ cjJ (Za) . _ and E (uj c2) - crj u  l-HZa) J - 1 , 2  
Once the parameters in the model have been estimated , one can use 
these expressions to compute the mean value of y for the two groups 
of individuals under the alternative choice. One should also 
interpret the error covariances , as was done in the simple example 
of hunting and fishing earlier . 
In the literature on labor supply , there has been 
considerable discussion of "individual heterogeneity" i . e .  the 
observed self-selection is due to individual characteristics not 
captured by the observed variables (some women want to work no matter 
what and some women want to sit at home no matter what) .  Obviously , 
these individual specific effects can only be analyzed if we have 
panel data. This problem has been analyzed by Heckman , but since 
these problems will be discussed in the chapters on labor supply 
models and analysis of cross-section and time-series data they 
will not be elaborated here. 
10 . MULTIPLE CRITERIA FOR SELECTIVITY 
There are several practical instances where selectivity 
could be due to several sources rather than j ust one as considered 
in the examples in the previous section . Griliches et . al .  (1979) 
cite several problems with the NLS young men data set that could 
lead to selectivity bias . Prominent among these are attrition 
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and (other) missing data problems . In such cases we would need to 
formulate the model as switching regression or switching simultaneous 
equations models where the switch depends on more than one criterian 
function. One such example is that by Abowd and Farber (1979) who 
consider the union and wages example of Lee (1978) . The model 
consists of a union wage equation (Y1) and a non-union wage equation 
(Y2 ) .  There are two decision functions : the decision of individuals 
to j oin a queue for union j obs (I�) and the decision of employers to 
draw individuals from the queue (I�) .  The specif ication of the model 
is : 
yl = X1f:31 + ul (10 . 1) 
y2 = X2f:32 + u2 (10 . 2) 
I� =  Zlyl - El (10 . 3) 
* I2 = Z2y2 - E2 (10 . 4) 
* 
If I1 > 0 the individual decides to j oin the queue for union j obs . 
* 
If I2 > 0 the individual is chosen from the queue for a union j ob .
* * 
Here we observe Y1 only if I1 > 0 and I2 > O .
* * 
set I1 < 0 and I2 > 0 will be empty .
In this example , the 
The analysis of the model in equations (10 . 1) to (10 . 4 )  will 
depend crucially on whether the two decisions are independent or 
correlated i . e .  whether Cov(E1 , E2) = 0 or not .  In case Cov (E1 , E2) 
we can easily extend the Heckman-Lee two-stage estimation methods to 
this model . 
Define A • •  l.J Cov(ui , Ej ) i 1 , 2 
j = 1 , 2 
0 
Then 
* * 
E (u1 1 I1 > O, I2 > O) 
(©Zlyl) c/l (Z2y2) A - A  --- 11 � (z1y1) 12 � (Z2y2) 
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Thus one gets preliminary consistent estimates of y1 and y2 by 
estimating equations (10 . 3) and (10 . 4) by the probit method . Next 
one regresses Y1 on x1 and the constructed variables
c/J (Zlyl) 
� (Zlyl) 
and ¢ <z2v 2) 
� <z2y2) 
In case El and E2 are correlated so that Cov (E1 , E2) = 012
the expressions get very messy . In this case we have to use 
bivariate probit methods to estimate y1 ,y2 and 012 . Further 
E (u1 I I� > 0 ,  I; > 0) = AllM12 + Al2M21 
where 
and P . J 
M • •  l.J 
f Zlyl 
- "' 
(1 - 0 2 ) -1 12 
J
Zlyl 
-00 
[Pi - Ol2 Pj] 
E/ (E1E2) dE2dEl 
F (Zlyl , Z2y2) 
These expressions can still be evaulated numerically . 
(10 . 5) 
There are as yet not many empirical examples where the 
selectivity is based on multiple criterion functions . Abowd and 
Farber (197 9) claim that their model with two decisions captures the 
effects of unions on wages better than a simple probit model for 
union status . However ,  their model with independent decision 
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equations is not likely to be of general applicability . Fishe et . al .  
(1979) consider a model with two correlated decision criteria. The 
model is one that determines wages of young women -- some of whom 
have college education others not .  The two decision equations 
(10. 3 )  and (10. 4) refer to the decision of whether to go to college
or not and whether to j oin the labor force or not . Though the 
example is somewhat contrived , this is the only empirical illustration 
with two correlated selectivity criteria . Fishe et . al .  estimate the 
parameters in equations (10 . 3 )  and (10. 4) by the bivariate probit
method and evaluate expressions of the form (10. S) by numerical 
methods . They then use the extension of the Heckman-Lee two-stage 
procedure . 
11 . CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We have examined the literature on disequilibrium and 
self-selection . Both classes of models fall in the category of 
switching models with endogenous switching . In some problems the 
model is a switching regression model; in others it is a switching 
simultaneous equations model . The estimation methods are by now 
well-known . Many investigators have used maximum likelihood methods 
and even when these are not computationally feasible,  we have 
two-step methods available that are easily computable and that give 
consistent estimates for the parameters . Of greater importance at 
this t ime is the empirical application of these methods in problems 
of some practical consequence .  The literature on self-selection 
contains interesting empirical applications in the areas of labor 
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supply , unions and wages and education and self-selfselection. 
However , the literature on disequilibrium models lacks any interesting 
empirical applications . Part of the problem here is that not much 
thought is of ten given to the substantive question of what the 
sources of disequilibrium are and also there are few micro data 
sets to which the methods have been applied . Almost all applications 
(Avery [ 1979]  is perhaps an exception) are based on aggregate
time-series data and there is not enough discussion of problems 
of aggregation6 • The Fair and Jaffee example on the housing
market as well as the different models of "credit rationing" are 
all based on aggregate data and there is much to be desired in the 
detailed specification of these models . 
Perhaps the most interesting application of the disequilibrium 
models are in the areas of regulated industries . After all it is 
regulation that produces disequilibrium in these markets . 
Consider for instance the loan demand problem with interest rate 
ceilings . If one has data on individual loans , one can formulate 
a demand and supply model and examine the effects of interest rate 
ceilings . The appropriate model in this case is a switching 
simultaneous equations model which is similar to the disequilibrium 
model discussed in section 6 .  I f  the rate o f  interest that equilibrates 
demand and supply is at or below the rate ceiling, the loan is 
granted . Otherwise the loan is denied . We have : 
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Loan demand Lt 
= alRt + 8iX1t + ult
}
Loan supply Lt = a2Rt + 
BzX2t + u2t
if Rt :::: R 
Lt = 0 otherwise . 
Structurally , this model is similar to the labor supply model 
considered by Heckman (1974) where hours worked H adjust to equilibrate
reservation wages and market wages and the individual works if H > 0.
Es timation of some disequilibrium models with micro-data 
sets for regulated industries and estimation of the effects of 
regulation would make the disequilibrium literature more intellectually 
appealing than it has been . 
There are also some issues that need to be investigated 
regarding the appropriate formulation of the demand and supply 
functions under disequilibrium. The expectation of disequilibrium 
can itself be expected to change the demand and supply functions . 
Further , there will be a spill-over from past disequilibrium into 
the current demand and supply . Such spill-over effects have as yet 
not been analyzed in any of the disequilibrium models . 
The literature on self-selection, by contrast to the 
disequilibrium literature , has several interesting empirical 
applications . However , even here a lot of work remains to be done . 
The case of selectivity being based on seyeral criteria rather than 
one has been mentioned in the last section . Another problem is 
the extension of the methodology to other error distributions and 
the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of normality often 
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made (see Olsen [1979]  for an initial attempt) . Till some progress
is made with alternative error distributions , one has to be careful 
in the choice of the functional form used . For instance where 
earnings functions are used , as often they are in these models , 
one can define the dependent variable in the log form , so that the 
assumption of normality is at least approximately valid . 
1 .  
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FOOTNOTES 
This procedure first used by Heckman (1976) for the labor supply 
model was extended to a wide class of models by Lee (1976 ) . 
2 .  Hartley and Mallela (1977) prove the strong consistency of the 
3 .  
maximum likelihood estimator but o n  the assumption that cr1 and cr2 
are bounded away from zero . 
The two-stage least squares methods described earlier can be 
easily applied for these models as well . We replace �pt by 
�p
t + 1 
in the definitions o f  z1t and z2t , y by y1 in equation (C) and 
Y by y2 in equation (D) . Also , Pt is no longer endogenous . Only 
z1t and z2t are endogenous . 
4 .  The formulation in terms o f  partial adjustment towards P* was 
suggested by Bowden (1978) though he does not use the interpreta-
tion of the Fair-Jaffee equation given here . 
5 .  These are well-known formulae for the moments of truncated normal . 
See Johnson and Kotz (1972) p p .  112-113. 
6 .  The papers by Batchelor (1977) and Muellbauer and Winter (1979 ) 
deal with aggregation problems in disequilibrium models . 
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